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I. Statement of the Case 
The instant appeal stems from an action to evict the Defendant, David B. Allen, from real 
property and to restore possession to the Plaintiff, Federal National Mortgage Association, aka 
Fannie Mae, following the conclusion of a non-judicial foreclosure sale. The subject property is 
commonly known as 1596 E. Shingle Mill Road, Sandpoint, Bonner County, Idaho, (hereafter 
referred to as the "Property"). The trial court entered a default judgment against Defendant, and 
later denied Defendant's motions to vacate the default judgment. Defendant now appeals from 
the trial court's order denying his second motion to vacate the default judgment. 
Plaintiff does not disagree with the chronology of events set forth in Defendant's 
statement of the case, though it does object to Defendant's characterization or spin on the facts 
listed therein. Moreover, several important facts were omitted from Defendant's statement. 
Plaintiff would offer the following additional facts to lend context to the matter. 
Plaintiffs predecessor in interest, Suntrust Mortgage, purchased the Property at a 
trustee's sale conducted on August 27, 2009. R. 8-9. A trustee's deed was issued to Suntrust 
Mortgage, and duly recorded on August 31, 2009 in the official records of Bonner County. R. 9. 
Thereafter, Suntrust Mortgage conveyed its interest in the Property to Plaintiff via Special 
Warranty Deed, which deed was also duly recorded. R. 9. When Defendant failed and/or 
refused to vacate the Property, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the First Judicial District Court on 
October 7, 2009. R. 10. The Complaint was signed by Mark Perison, as the attorney for 
Plaintiff. R. 12. 
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Defendant filed a "Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss; Motion for Sanctions" on November 
16, 2009. R. 13-15. Plaintiff, through Mr. Perison, filed an application for entry of default on 
December 4, 2009, and a default judgment was entered on December 11, 2009. R. 1, 23-24. On 
January 26, 2010, the default judgment was set aside pursuant to the parties' stipulation. R. 26-
27. On February 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed a notice of substitution of counsel, wherein Mr. Perison 
withdrew, and Derrick J. O'Neill was substituted as counsel ofrecord for Plaintiff. R. 175-176. 
The notice was signed by both Mr. Perison and Mr. O'Neill. Id. On February 17, 2010, a 
hearing on Defendant's motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions was rescheduled for March 
17, 2010. R. 2. 
On March 9, 2010, prior to the scheduled hearing, Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to take 
default. R. 177-1 78. On March 1 7, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on Defendant's motion 
to dismiss, in which it determined that the motion to dismiss would be denied, which rendered 
the motion for sanctions moot. TR. March 17, 2010, p. 20, 1. 5 through p. 30, L 17. At that time, 
the Court also advised Defendant that he needed to follow the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
and file an answer. TR. March 17, 2010, p. 31, 11. 7-13. An order denying the motion to dismiss 
was entered on March 24, 2010. R. 3 0-31. On April 5, 2010, with Defendant yet to file an 
answer to the Complaint, Plaintiff filed an application for entry of a default judgment for failure 
to plead or otherwise defend, together with affidavits in support of the application. R. 184-193. 
A default judgment was entered on April 7, 2010, and the case was closed. R. 34-35. 
Thereafter, on April 14, 2010, Defendant filed an Emergency Motion for Stay, an 
Emergency Motion to Quash the Writ of Ejectment, a Motion to Vacate Judgment, as well as an 
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Answer and Counterclaim. R. 36-8 l. The Court conducted a hearing on these motions on April 
21, 2010, at the conclusion of which it took the matters under advisement. On May 27, 2010, the 
Court entered a written decision and order denying the Defendant's motion to vacate the 
judgment. R. 87-94. After that order was entered, Defendant filed a reply brief in support of the 
previously filed motion to dismiss, R. 95 - 98, together with an affidavit in support of the motion 
to vacate. R. 101 - 117. In response to those filings, Plaintiff filed a written objection to the 
motion to vacate the default judgment. R. 118 - l 20. 
On July 2, 2010, Defendant filed another motion to vacate the judgment with another 
brief in support of that motion. R. l 21 - 159. Defendant scheduled that motion for hearing on 
July 21, 2010. Id. Although Plaintiff had not filed a written response, Defendant filed a reply 
brief on July l 5, 2010. R. l 60 - 164. Following a hearing on July 21, 2010, the Court denied 
the Defendant's motion to vacate the judgment, see TR. July 21, 2010, p. l 4, 1. 22, and the order 
was entered on July 23, 2010. R. 165-166. Defendant filed his notice of appeal on August 2, 
2010. R. 167-170. 
II. Issues on Appeal 
The primary issues on appeal raised by Defendant all relate to standing. Defendant 
suggests that the Court was without standing to rule on his motion to dismiss the case, that Mr. 
O'Neill did not have standing to appear on behalf of Plaintiff; and that Fannie Mae was without 
standing to bring the original complaint. Ancillary to these concerns, Defendant suggests that 
the Idaho statutes concerning non-judicial foreclosure are unconstitutional and that the Court 
abused its discretion in failing to rule in Defendant's favor. 
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Defendant's actions have caused plaintiff to seek to assistance of attorneys to prosecute 
the underlying district court complaint and represent its interests through this appeal. Plaintiff 
should be entitled to its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120 
and 12-121. In as much as Defendant is representing his own interests in this appeal, his request 
for an award of attorney's fees should be denied. 
III. Argument 
Defendant's concerns regarding standing are without merit and result from a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the concept of jurisdiction and standing. For the reasons set forth herein, 
the decisions of the trial court should be affirmed. 
A. The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Defendant argues that because Judge V erby was the judge assigned to his case, Judge 
Hosack was without "standing" to rule on his motion to dismiss, and the resulting order was 
therefore void ab initio. This contention is incorrect. 
Defendant seems to suggest that a retired district judge may only serve in a district court 
position upon the request and order of the chief justice. See State v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 94, 98 
(Idaho 1996) ("' A retired district judge may hold a district court position upon the request and 
order of the chief justice."). In Pratt, Judge Prather, a retired district judge, was appointed to 
hold court for the purpose of disposing of all matters and proceedings concerning that particular 
case. Plaintiff does not dispute that the Idaho Constitution allows for a retired judge to be 
appointed for extended periods of time and for multiple matters and that one mechanism to make 
such an appointment is via request and order of the chief justice. However, the plain language of 
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the Idaho Constitution also provides for more limited appearances by retired judges or other 
district judges. "A judge of any district court, or any retired justice of the Supreme Court or any 
retired district judge, may hold a district court in any county at the request of the judge of the 
district court thereofI-J" Idaho Constitution, Article Y, Section 12. 
Thus, all that is required under this latter circumstance is a simple invitation by the 
assigned district judge. See, e.g., Kettenbach v. Walker, 186 P. 912, 913 (Idaho 1919) (there can 
be no question that a district judge from one district may preside in another district under certain 
circumstances, and an invitation from either the judge of the district or from the Governor would 
have conferred the requisite authority); Ferguson v. McGuire, 104 P.1028 (Idaho 1909) (a judge 
invited to assist in trying of cases of another judge has full authority to try the matter). That is 
precisely what happened in this case. Judge Yerby clearly indicated on the record that he had 
invited Judge Hosack to hold court in his stead during the time in which Judge Yerby was out of 
the county. TR. July 21, 2010, p. 13, IL 8-14. The reason Judge Yerby was absent at the hearing 
is irrelevant, and his request that Judge Hosack cover the hearing shows no disrespect to this 
honorable Court or the parties. 
Thus, being properly invited by Judge Yerby, Judge Hosack was clothed with all the 
authority necessary to rule on Defendant's motion to dismiss. Judge Hosack articulated the 
reasons why the motion to dismiss should be denied, and Defendant has not shown that 
reasoning to be clearly erroneous. See Tr. March 17, 2010, p. 28, l. 5 through p. 30, l. 
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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B. The trial court did not err in determining that Mr. O'Neill could appear on 
behalf of Plaintiff. 
Defendant also alleges that Mr. Perison and Mr. O'Neill failed to comply with Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 11 (b){l ), and that these purported failings prohibited Mr. O'Neill from 
representing Plaintiffs interests in this case. Throughout these proceedings, Defendant 
frequently referred to Mr. O'Neill as lacking "standing" to represent Plaintiff. 
In his brief, Defendant argues that the notice of substitution that he received from Mr. 
Perison was not signed by both attorneys. See R. 110 - 111. A review of one of his filed 
affidavits indicates that this notice was attached to a letter drafted and mailed by Mr. Perison' s 
office on March 2, 2010. See R. 103. Plaintiff concedes that this notice only appears to contain 
the signature of Mr. Perison. Defendant then suggests that it is irrelevant if the court records 
show something otherwise. See Defendant's First Brief, p. 14. He suggests that the notice, 
signed by both the withdrawing and the substituting attorney, must be provided to all parties. Id. 
Plaintiff disagrees with Defendant's contention that the court records are irrelevant. In fact, the 
court record does contain a notice of substitution that was signed by both Mr. Perison and Mr. 
O'Neill. See, R. 175 176. Moreover, that notice contains a certificate of service that confirms 
that it was mailed to Defendant on February 11, 2010 at the same address used by Mr. Perison's 
office in the later correspondence. Id. Defendant has not suggested that he did not receive the 
notice sent by Mr. O'Neill on February 11, 2010, rather, he has only implied that the later notice 
sent by Mr. Perison's office did not contain Mr. O'Neill's signature. This anomaly can easily be 
explained by careful investigation of the court record, and the three separate facsimile signatures 
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at the top of the document. See R. 17 5-176. The notice of substitution was drafted by Mr. 
O'Neill, and then faxed to Mr. Perison for his review and signature. After Mr. Perison signed 
the document, it was faxed back to Mr. O'Neill, who then added his signature. The notice, with 
both signatures, was then faxed to the Court for filing. 
Despite being an apparent stumbling block for Defendant, the court determined that the 
substitution of counsel was proper. Judge Hosack explained, 
I appreciate your arguments but this is a change of attorneys pursuant to Rule 
11 (b )( 1) Notice of Substitution. We see this over and over in cases. It's just 
routine. And the Notice of Substitution is proper pursuant to the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. So we need to address - get past your problem with having a 
different attorney representing [Plaintiff] and address the substantive issues that 
you want the Court to be thinking about[.] 
TR. March 17, 2010, p. 24, 11. 4 - 12. Even after the court had decided the issue, Defendant 
continued to suggest the substitution was improper, and the Court once again addressed the issue. 
Drawing upon persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, Judge Yerby noted that even if there 
were an irregularity in the notice of substitution, Defendant had failed to show that he was 
prejudiced in any way by the substitution of Mr. O'Neill. TR. July 21, 2010, p. 11, l. 1 through 
p. 12, l. 22. Indeed, Defendant was not prejudiced by the substitution of attorneys. On multiple 
occasions, the court outlined the reasons for its decision and Defendant has not shown these 
decisions to be an abuse of discretion or clearly erroneous. 
C. The trial court did not err when it denied Defendant's motions to vacate the 
default judgment. 
The district court generally has discretion whether to vacate a default judgment. 1\1eyers 
v. Hansen, 221 P.3d 81, 86 (Idaho 2009). As this Court has explained, 
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When faced with an appeal from a discretionary determination, the appellate court 
must decide: ( 1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as 
discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its 
discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the 
trial court reached its determination through an exercise of reason. 
State v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 94, 98 (Idaho 1996) (citing State v. Hedger, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Idaho 
1989) (quoting Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987))). 
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's 
motion to vacate the default judgment. 
After taking Defendant's motion to vacate under advisement, the Court issued a reasoned 
decision outlining why the motion should be denied. There can be no doubt that Defendant was 
well aware of his responsibility to file an answer to Plaintiffs complaint. As the district court 
mentioned in its decision, Defendant was given notice of Plaintiffs intent to take a default by 
Plaintiff's counsel on March 9, 2010, and subsequently admonished by the court on March 17, 
2010 to file an answer. R. 88. Yet, even after these warnings, Defendant's answer was not 
forthcoming. It was not until after the default judgment had been entered that Defendant finally 
filed an answer. Not only was Defendant's responsive pleading tardy, but his request to vacate 
the default judgment failed to articulate any grounds to justify it being granted. 
Defendant sought to avoid the consequences of his tardiness on the grounds of excusable 
neglect and fraud pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b )(1) and (3 ). To each of these 
points, the district court properly and adequately explained why the facts in this case did not 
warrant the relief sought. See R. 89-91. Moreover, as the court further explained, Defendant had 
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failed to set forth any proof of a meritorious defense to Plaintiffs complaint. R. 91-92. This 
requirement is well-settled: 
When moving to set aside a default judgment, the moving party must not only 
meet the requirements ofl.R.C.P. 60(b) but must also plead facts which, if 
established, would constitute a defense to the action. It would be an idle exercise 
for the court to set aside a default if there is in fact no real justiciable controversy. 
The defense matters must be detailed. 
Meyers, 912 P. 3d at 87 (citing Idaho State Police v. Real Property, 156 P.3d 561, 563-64 (Idaho 
2007)). 
Defendant attempted to remedy his shortcomings by filing a subsequent motion to vacate 
the judgment. At the hearing on this second motion to vacate, Defendant once again raised the 
same concerns that he had previously argued before the court. Defendant's motion was, in 
effect, a motion for reconsideration of the court's earlier decision. Such a motion is not 
permitted by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See I.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B) ("there shall be no 
motion for reconsideration of an order of the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 
50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b)."). Given that the court had previously 
articulated its reasoning as to why the first motion to vacate the judgment would be denied, and 
that the procedural rules do not permit for a request for reconsideration in this context, the court 
did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the second motion to vacate would be denied. 
2. Idaho Courts have consistently held that Idaho's non-judicial 
foreclosure statutes are constitutional. 
The Idaho non-judicial foreclosure statutes provide debtors with significant notice of 
pending foreclosure proceedings. The constitutionality of those statutes has been repeatedly 
Page 9 of 13 
Respondent's Brief 
reaffirmed by the Idaho Appellate Courts. See, e.g., Security Pacific Finance Corp. v. Bishop, 
704 P.2d 357 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985), Roos v. Belcher, 321 P.2d210 (Idaho 1958). 
Having been thus upheld, Plaintiff is entitled to rely upon these statutory provisions. 
Idaho Code § 45-1510 provides: 
When a trustee's deed is recorded in the deed records of the county where the 
property described in the deed is located, the recitals contained in the deed and the 
affidavits required under § 45-1505(7), shall be prima facie evidence in any court 
of the truth of the recitals and the affidavits. However, the recitals and affidavits 
are conclusive in favor of a purchaser in good faith for value or any successor in 
interest thereof. 
Idaho Code § 45-1510. 
In addition, Idaho Code§ 45-1506(11) provides: 
The purchaser at the trustee's sale shall be entitled to possession of the property 
on the tenth day following sale, and any persons remaining in possession 
thereafter under any interest except one prior to the deed of trust shall be deemed 
to be tenants at sufferance. 
Idaho Code§ 45-1506(11). 
Moreover, the effect of the trustee's sale is set forth in Idaho Code § 45-1508, which 
provides: 
A sale made by a trustee under this act shall foreclose and terminate all interest in 
the property covered by the deed of trust if all persons to whom notice is given 
under § 45-1506, Idaho Code, and any other persons claiming by, through or 
under such persons and such persons shall have no right to redeem the property 
from the purchaser at the trustee's sale. The failure to give notice to any such 
persons by mailing, personal service, posting or publication in accordance with § 
45-1506, Idaho Code, shall not affect the validity of the sale as to persons so 
notified nor as to any persons having actual knowledge of the sale. 
Idaho Code § 45-1508. 
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Defendant had actual knowledge of the foreclosure proceedings, and as a result, cannot 
attack the validity of the sale. Whatever interest Defendant formerly had in the Property was 
terminated and foreclosed upon the completion of the sale. In this case, the issuance and 
recording of the trustee's deed is aprima jacie showing of compliance with Idaho's non-judicial 
foreclosure statutes. As the successor in interest to the purchaser at the trustee's sale, and 
pursuant to the statutory presumptions set forth in these statutes, Plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
sought in its Complaint as a matter oflaw. 
3. Plaintiff was the real party in interest and had standing to bring the 
original complaint. 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure require every action to be prosecuted in the name of the 
real party in interest. I.R.C.P. 17(a). "A real party in interest is 'one who has a real, actual, 
material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action."' Citibank (South Dakota), 
N.A. v. Carroll, 220 P.3d 1073, 1076-77 (Idaho 2009) (quoting Caughey v. George Jensen & 
Sons, 258 P.2d 357, 359 (Idaho 1953)). "Generally, the holder oflegal title to the subject matter 
of a cause of action is a real party in interest." ld. at 1077. As previously set forth, Suntrust 
Mortgage acquired title to the Property via trustee's sale on August 27, 2009. Suntrust Mortgage 
was issued a trustee's deed, which was duly recorded in the official records of Bonner County. 
Suntrust Mortgage thereafter transferred its interest in the Property to Plaintiff via Special 
Warranty Deed which was recorded in the official records of Bonner County. R. 9. 
Accordingly, Plaintiff held legal title to the Property and was entitled to possession pursuant to 
Page 11 of 13 
Respondent's Brief 
Idaho law. As such, Plaintiff was the real party in interest, and had the authority to bring this 
suit. 
IV. Conclusion 
Pursuant to the Idaho non-judicial foreclosure statutes, Plaintiff acquired title to the 
Property and had a right to possession. When Defendant refused to vacate the Property, Plaintiff 
properly brought suit to remove Defendant from the Property and restore possession in Plaintiff. 
The district court has jurisdiction over the action, and the authority to decide all matters before it. 
Defendant failed to comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, and a judgment was issued 
against Defendant. The district court did not err in denying Defendant's repeated attempts to set 
aside the judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the decision of the district court should be 
AFFIRMED. 
DATED, this 16th day of September, 2011 
By: 
Brian angford, of the firm 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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